March 2010
    
Controls Over Changes Made to Direct Deposit Routing Numbers
    (A-02-08-28052)
Objective
To determine the effectiveness of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) controls over multiple direct deposit routing number changes made to the same beneficiary’s account in a short period of time.
Background
The Debt collection Improvement act of 1996 requires that certain Federal payments be processed by electronic fund transfers (direct deposit). This requirement applies to Title II benefit payments SSA makes to its beneficiaries. Benefit payments that are direct deposited into a beneficiary’s bank account are a cost-effective and secure method of disbursing Social Security payments to beneficiaries both within and outside the United States.
To view the full report, visit http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-02-0828052.pdfOur Findings
SSA’s automated  controls over bank account routing number changes did not detect or alert SSA  staff of multiple bank information changes made to the same beneficiary’s  account over a short period of time.  All  172 beneficiaries we reviewed had multiple direct deposit account and routing  number changes made within a 3-month period.   SSA was able to contact 130 of these beneficiaries.  Through the results of those contacts and our  analysis of the beneficiaries’ records, we were able to rule out the  possibility of fraud as the cause of the bank information changes.  However, SSA was unable to contact 29 of the  172 beneficiaries to determine whether they were aware of the bank information  changes made.  Of the 29 beneficiaries,  25 are still being issued payments.  We  could not determine whether changes made to the direct deposit account and  routing numbers for these 
25 beneficiaries were proper.
Our Conclusion
Accordingly,  we recommended that SSA:  (1) contact the  25 beneficiaries who were not located and are still receiving benefit payments  to determine whether they authorized the changes made to their routing numbers  and whether they should continue to receive their benefits.  For the beneficiaries who cannot be contacted,  SSA should suspend and/or terminate their benefit payments; (2) after concluding the status of the 25  beneficiaries, determine whether an automated control alerting SSA staff of  multiple direct deposit routing number changes made to the same beneficiary’s  account in a short period of time would assist in identifying unauthorized  changes to a beneficiary’s direct deposit information;  and (3) modify the Program Operations Manual System to alert its employees that  allegations of non-receipt for directly deposited benefit payments and unauthorized  changes of direct deposit routing numbers could possibly be the result of fraud  and, if fraud is suspected, referrals to the Office of the Inspector General,  Office of Investigations, should occur.
 
SSA  agreed with the recommendations.